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The experience in Latin America and elsewhere shows no close correspondence between 
development planning and actiial project selection. In some extreme cases, governments 
have found themselves embarrassed by their inability to generate sufficient projects to 
exhaust foreign aid provided in the form of p r o g r a m m e finance. But even when there was 
no shortage of potential projects, it m a y not have always been possible to demonstrate 
that particular projects selected within the framework of a development programme were, 
of all the available alternatives, those best suited for furthering the purposes of that 
programme. This naturally could be the case if the costs an<i benefits of particular 
projects are not readily quantifiable -as in the fields of health or education- because 
selection might then have to be based on judgment unsupported by quantitative analysis. 
In other instances, however, when numerical valuation would be possible, the selection 
of projects m a y still not demostrably correspond to the relative priorities of the over-all 
plan or programme, because the methods of project valuation m a y not be properly 
understood or applied. 
It is the gap or lack of correspondence between plan purposes and project selec-
tion which has motivated several recent efforts to study and evolve applicable criteria 
for project valuation.!^ If rigorous means for computing a project's social profitabi-
lity can be designed, and if all potential projects can be valued accordinglv^ then from 
the alternatives those projects with the highest social profits can be selected for imple-
mentation. 
Measurement of social profitability requires a quantifiable description of the 
connection between social welfare and the diverse activities affecting it. Given that total 
welfare can be represented by a relationship in which all activities of direct welfare 
interest are entered with suitable weights - i. e. , that there is a well defined welfare 
function- and that the purpose of planning is to maximize welfare subject to the diverse 
technical, political and market constraints, the value of each added project or activity 
is determined by its contribution to the value of the welfare function. 
Such an approach to project selection may, however, be more readily applicable 
to planning in an individual nation -be it an open or a closed economy- than in the context 
of an economically integrated group of countries. In a single nation which has a degree 
of social and political homogeneity (a willingness to accept and to further social goals 
which m a y conflict with and override particular individual interests) it m a y be legitimate 
S e e , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e f o r t h c o m i n g w o r k s b y I. D. L i t t l e a n d J a m e s M i r r l e e s ( s p o n s o r e d b y O E C D ) a n d b y 
S . A . M a r g l i n , A . K. S e n e t a l . ( S p o n s o r e d b y U N I D O ) . T h e s e a r e n o t y e t a v a i l a b l e i n f i n a l f o r m . F o r 
p u b l i s h e d s o u r c e s s e e r e f e r e n c e s at t h e e n d o f t h i s p a p e r . 
and feasible to assume the existence of a dominant national concept of welfare which can 
be summarized, at least in schematic form, in a unique welfare function. On the other 
hand, in the case of economic integration which is a loose federation of otherwise 
politically independent nations, social and political homogeneity and the existence of a 
unique concept of welfare could not be expected. It is one thing to reach agreement on, 
say, domestic income redistribution and another to agree on international redistribution 
of incomes. In fact, unless economic integration is also accompanied by the formation 
of a political or governmental union among the participating countries, a unique welfare 
function for the integrated Region m a y not be definable. Hence, a unique set of criteria 
for the valuation of "integration projects ", i. e., projects specially conducive to promoting, 
strengthening or building economic interrelationships among Latin American countries, 
m a y not exist either. For this reason, where project valuation is concerned, much 
depends on the nature and purpose of integration. 
Economic and political integration m a y be wanted per se. This m a y be for 
sentimental reasons, i.e., because of a desire to realize Latin unity, or for rational 
considerations, such as the expectation that an integrated Region^/ could carry greater 
weight in international political and economic negotiations than the s u m of its components. 
I shall not further consider these possibilities, not because they are irrelevant -they 
m a y have important implications for economic development- but because this is not the 
place to discuss them. In any case, to the extent that integration is desired per se, in 
the valuation of integration projects a positive weight must be attached to the fulfillment 
of this objetive as well. 
For the purposes of this discussion, I shall assume that integration can be 
justified by the expectation of a favorable effect on the economic development of the 
Region as a whole. This would be in response to the subsequent increase in inter-
regional trade andfactor movements which in turn would bring about improved resource in 
utilization due to production according to comparative advantage, exploitation of scale 
economies and other favorable static and dynamic changes. The measurable gains from 
integration would consist of an outward shift of the production possibility frontier of the 
Region as a whole. This increase in the total productivity of the integrated Region could 
not be automatically equated, however, with a net welfare gain in all participating countries 
or even for the Region as a whole. 3/ The reason is that integration would necessarily 
have to result in changes in the national and international distribution of income which 
-if hot compensated for- m a y not be consistent with what is considered socially just by 
the affected individual societies (governments) or by the Latin American community as a 
whole. 
- I ' l l 
^ The t e r m " r e g i o n " throughout this study r e l a t e s to L a t i n A m e r i c a as a whole . 
3 / I n t e g r a t i o n r e q u i r e s that ins tead of the q u a s i - b i l a t e r a l e c o n o m i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s L a t i n A m e r i c a n c o u n t r i e s 
now individual ly m a i n t a i n with hard c u r r e n c y b loks , the i n t e g r a t i n g countries should deve lop t h e i r r e s o u r c e s 
on a r e g i o n a l l y m u l t i l a t e r a l b a s i s and that t rading r e l a t i o n s h i p s with the r e s t of the wor ld should be m a i n -
ta ined by the R e g i o n as a whole. T h i s n e c e s s a r i l y would b r i n g about t r a d e d i v e r s i o n s o m e of which might 
be h a r m f u l to the R e g i o n o r the r e s t of the wor ld o r both. T h i s I dis regard^ in the d i s c u s sion.»-- ' -
Free Trade and Integration 
The traditional concept of international trade is based on the notion that well-defined 
national boundaries exist which prevent the international movement of productive factors 
but do not hinder the movement of commodities. ^  The motivation to trade is provided 
by the unequal absolute and relative resource endowments of the trading nations (absolute 
and comparative advantage) and by the increasing returns to scale in those industries 
which due to the limitations of domestic markets cannot attain a m i n i m u m efficient size. 
In the case of trade motivated by absolute or comparative advantage, the changes in the 
structure of production and factor markets can be brought about by competitive market 
forces ¡however, the exploitation of scale economies can take place only in a monopolistic 
setting so that in the absence of government intervention, an a priori expectation about 
the direction of specialization and market adjustment m a y not be had. In either case, 
within the limits imposed by natural and artificial trade barriers, trade tends to close 
the gap between the price ratios (terms of trade) prevailing in the individual national 
markets. Since real factor prices are also affected in the process, trade results in a 
change in the functional distribution of income, i.e., that distribution which is determined 
by competitive market forces in response to the relative scarcities prevailing in the 
factor markets. 
The gains from trade consist of an increased supply of goods for domestic use, 
i. e. , more can be had of some or all commodities than would be attainable in autarky. 
In the case of trade motivated by increasing returns to scale, the source of this gain is 
obvious. However, to realize it, an adequate government control of monopolies, i. e. , 
of pricing and resource allocation, m a y be necessary. Under competitive conditions the 
gains from trade are derived from a more efficient utilization of the unequally distributed 
productive resources among the trading nations. Furthermore, if competition prevails, 
some gains from trade are assured for each trading nation. This, of course, does not 
m e a n that every individual or group necessarily profits from trade. However, a welfare 
gain can be assured if those who within any one nation are adversely affected by trade 
can be compensated from the gains from trade. 
Thus the above concept of international trade describes a world in which a series 
of spatially separated markets are linked through commodity movements. The interna-
tional movement of productive factors is not permitted, but a more efficient resource 
utilization is nonetheless possible; commodity flows substitute, as it were, for the 
international reallocation of resources. 
^ F o r a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e p u r e t h e o r y o f t r a d e s e e e . g . , K i n d l e b e r g e r t U . 
If trade is not profitable, nonparticipation or the option of autarkic production is 
automatically open to any one nation. This much is assured by competitive market 
responses. The latter provide protection, however, only against a reduction of the 
domestic consumption capacity below its autarkic level and not against a potential welfare 
loss caused by trade induced adverse changes in the distribution of income. If compen-
sation from the gains from trade is not feasible for those who are adversely affected, the 
possibility of a welfare loss cannot be excluded. 
In contrast to the case of free trade, the option of nonparticipation is by definition 
not given to m e m b e r countries in a fully integrated Region. Integration means that in 
addition to free commodity trade, the movement of productive factors is also unhindered 
within the Region. It is to be expected that upon integration commodity flows as well as 
factor movements (migration and capital flows) will take place in a pattern which is 
determined by the supply and demand conditions in the different participating countries. 
The motivation for trade among the participants is based on Regional price differences, 
and factor movements are induced by the prevailing rent or wage differentials. Subject 
to the cost of migration or capital transfer, in the absence of other barriers, factor 
movements will continue until real factor returns are equalized everywhere within the 
integrated Region. As a consequence, in contrast to the earlier case of international 
trade, it is possible that one or more of the Regions could be deprived of productive 
factors. In fact, as long as production is m o r e profitable in some Regions than in others, 
productive effort m a y become concentrated in one or a few efficient Regions, leaving the 
less efficient Regions with diminished productive activity.^ 
Actually, herein lies the fundamental difference between trade and integration. 
With trade there is choice between autarky and participation in international markets 
and, in either case, the original resource endowments can be retained by the individual 
nations. In a state of integration the loss of some resources by one country to some 
other m e m b e r country m a y be inevitable and in extreme cases integration could lead to 
a reduction in the level of economic activity in a particular m e m b e r country. There is 
reason to believe, however, that in a world in which various frictions m a y slow down 
the process of adjustment, the difference between international trade and integration m a y 
be only a matter of degree. At least in the short run, the transition from an imperfect 
international trading relationship to a state of integration m a y not drastically change 
trade flows and the pattern of Regional resource distribution. Nonetheless, in a dinamic 
world, it is likely that in the long run both trade and factor movements can m o r e readily 
develop through integration. ^ 
Though integration m a y adversely affect the domestic production capacity of a 
less developed or less efficient m e m b e r nation, it is nonetheless possible that a corre--
sponding welfare loss could be avoided. Specifically, if nonconstant returns to scale 
prevail in productive activities or if the initial factor endowments are skewed -e.g.,there 
is surplus land or labor in any participating country- integration makes it possible 
^ S e e C h a p t e r 8 i n L e f e b e r t 3 ] a n d C h a p t e r 6 t o 8 i n LefeberL4]. 
^ T h i s should b e p a r t i c u l a r l y the c a s e in L a t i n A m e r i c a w h e r e t h e c u l t u r a l b a c k g r o u n d of t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i s 
r e a s o n a b l y h o m o g e n e o u s . One of t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t c u r r e n t t r a d e b a r r i e r s , t h e l a c k of an e f f i c i e n t i n t r a -
r e g i o n a l t r a n s p o r t and c o m m u n i c a t i o n s s y s t e m , could be r e a d i l y o v e r c o m e by a v i g o r o u s i n t e g r a t i o n p o l i c y . 
through the concomitant factor movements to produce m o r e of some or all commodities 
within the integrated Region than would be feasible if all countries were producing in 
autarky or trading without international reallocation of resources. In other words, in-
tegration increases the production possibilities for the Region as a whole; hence, the 
compensation of adversely affected m e m b e r countries is also possible. 
Institutional Requirements 
Thus the compensation principle can be invoked to justify not only free trade but also 
integration. 2/ The problem is, however, that the existence of the means for the 
implementation of the principle can not be taken for granted. This is so because the 
feasability of compensation depends: a) on a clear knowledge of and political agreement 
on where social justice lies and b) on the pragmatic issue whether the necessary 
institutional requirements for carrying out a suitable scheme of compensation are 
available. The first requirement assumes that there exist adequate institutions and 
processes for obtaining national and international (Regional) consensus with regard to 
income distribution. The second requirement implies that there is a legal and organi-
zational capacity for bringing about the desired national and international distribution of 
incomes. 
This is not an academic question. Domestic consensus in any one nation on the 
desirability of participation and international agreement on the form of integration m a y 
not be readily forthcoming unless there is also some assurance that the national and 
Regional productivity gains can be translated into welfare gains. 
7 / It i s a w e l l - k n o w n t h e o r e n n o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e t h e o r y t h a t u n d e r c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s f r e e t r a d e c o m b i n e d 
w i t h t h e u s e o f n e u t r a l { l u m p s u m ) t a x e s a n d s u b s i d i e s f o r t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f b e n e f i t s , l e a d s t o a h i g h e r 
l e v e l o f u t i l i t y i n e a c h t r a d i n g c o u n t r y t h a n a n y l e v e l o f u t i l i t y a t t a i n a b l e i n a u t a r k y o r w i t h r e s t r i c t e d t r a d e . 
F o r a r i g o r o u s a r g u m e n t s e e S a m u e l s o n t S ] . T h e p o l i c y r e l e v a n c e o f t h e t h e o r e m d e p e n d s n o t o n l y o n i t s 
a s s u m p t i o n s - e . g . . c o m p e t i t i o n , e t c . - b u t a l s o o n w h e t h e r t h e r e e x i s t s a n o p e r a t i o n a l p r o c e d u r e f o r t h e 
r e q u i s i t e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e b e n e f i t s . 
8 / T o b e s u r e , e v e n t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y g a i n s c o u l d n o t b e s e c u r e d w i t h o u t a g r a d u a l a n d a r d u o u s p r o c e s s o f 
p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e o r i e n t a t i o n f r o m e c o n o m i c n a t i o n a l i s m a n d b i l a t e r a l o u t w a r d o r i e n t a t i o n t o i n t e r -
r e g i o n a l c o o p e r a t i o n . T h i s d e m a n d s n o t o n l y p o l i t i c a l w i l l i n g n e s s t o a c t a c c o r d i n g l y , b u t a l s o t h e c r e a t i o n 
o f a w h o l e s e t o f n e w i n s t i t u t i o n s n e e d e d t o c o p e w i t h t h e p r o b l e m s o f p o l i t i c a l a n d e c o n o m i c r e o r i e n t a t i o n . 
A m o n g t h e l a t t e r t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o n e s w o u l d b e a p a y m e n t s a g r e e m e n t a n d a n o n p o l i t i c a l f o r u m f o r 
a r b i t r a t i o n a m o n g t h e i n t e g r a t i n g n a t i o n s . A p a y m e n t s a g r e e m e n t w o u l d b e n e c e s s a r y t o p r o t e c t t h e p a r -
t i c i p a n t s a g a i n s t a r e a l o r i m a g i n e d l o s s i n f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y a n d , p e r h a p s , t o f a c i l i t a t e a 
c o o r d i n a t e d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n a g a i n s t s c a r c e c u r r e n c i e s . A n o n p o l i t i c a l f o r u m f o r a r b i t r a t i o n , o n t h e o t h e r 
h a n d , w o u l d m a k e i t p o s s i b l e t o r e m o v e o r s e p a r a t e t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s o f i n t e r r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t s f r o m t h e 
d a y t o d a y n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s o f t h e m e m b e r c o u n t r i e s . O f p r i m e i m p o r t a n c e i s t o d e a l i n a n o n - n a t i o n a l i s t i c 
m a n n e r w i t h t h o s e i n t e r r e g i o n a l a l l o c a t i o n p r o b l e m s w h i c h c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t p r o c e s s e s c a n n o t r e s o l v e , 
s u c h a s m a r k e t s h a r i n g a g r e e m e n t s b e t w e e n s u p p l i e r s o f g o o d s p r o d u c e d u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f i n c r e a s i n g 
r e t u r n s t o s c a l e , i n c e n t i v e p r i c i n g f o r a g r i c u l t u r e a n d o t h e r p r o b l e m s a f f e c t i n g t r a d e p o l i c y . 
I£ it is assumed that in one form or another free trade or integration can be 
accomplished, what institutional means are available which could ensure a socially just 
redistribution of the gains? A s far as internal redistribution is concerned, the existing 
means vary according to the established institutions from country to country. However, 
to the extent that redistribution depends on progressive taxation and direct income 
transfers, it is clear that the currently available means are at best marginal in most 
Latin American countries. As far as international redistribution among the nations of 
the Region is concerned, the means are for all practical purposes nonexistent. But 
assuming that effective means for redistribution could be devised, criteria according to 
which the gains should be redistributed nationally and internationally would also have to 
be determined. In this respect not m u c h can be said about international redistribution 
because in the absence of a unique supranational concept of welfare it is a mater for 
international agreement and the corresponding criteria could be specified only accordingly. 
In contrast, criteria for domestic income redistribution within each particular nation 
can be derived from the stated goals of development if these can be specified in the form 
of a national welfare function. 
T h e Goals of Development 
If it is agreed upon that the immediate purpose of integration is to attain greater produc-
tivity through improved factor utilization, there remains the more fundamental question: 
what social purposes is this improved efficiency supposed to serve? It is evident that 
each country, depending on its own social priorities, would want to pursue somewhat 
different or differently weighted purposes. Nonetheless, in all parts of Latin America 
there is broad agreement on the highest political level that priorities should be consistent 
with and conducive to social and economic development. 
This, then, is the light in which integration must be considered. Since it is 
meant to serve the development interests of the participating countries, its value, and 
hence the value of activities and projects undertaken for advancing integration, must 
also be established in terms of the development interests of the same countries. 
The implication is that since integration projects by definition must have welfare 
consequences in m o r e than one country, their valuation requires a knowledge of not only 
the goals of development but also their relative weighting in all affected Latin American 
countries. This is a tall order considering that in spite of the not dissimilar cultural 
heritage there is nonetheless a wide variation of physical and social condition within the 
Region. Furthermore, the purposes of development are so complex that their complete, 
description, let alone relative weighting, would be impossible even for a single country. 
Fortunately, however, certain fruitful simplifications as well as generalizations 
are possible. The necessity of an adequate rate of economic growth combined-with 
improvements in the standard of living of the lower income groups was recogiiize^b^ 
all signatories of the Charter of Punta del Este. F r o m this it follows that when, so 
goals are set, the primary attention must be focused on the problem of how to balance 
the welfare of current and future generations. In other words, it is the socially desirable;; 
time path of consumption (private and public) -i.e., its current level and its rate o f — 
growth- together with its distribution which must be determined. 
If there exists this c o m m o n denominator for the consideration of social goals, 
there also exists the possibility of obtaining a cohesive strategy for Regional development 
which is homogeneous of purpose and consistent with particular national interests. Indus-
trial development -stimulated by free trade or integration- would have to be combined 
with a massive effort to strengthen the demand for unskilled labor which in turn would 
also require the development of the Region's agricultural and other primary resources.^ 
Such an approach would be quite in keeping with the stated purposes of Latin American 
development, because in addition to motivating growth it would, in the process, also 
provide the means for effective income redistribution. 10/ 
5 
Models for Project Valuation 
It should be clear by now that project valuation is inherently an empirical task which 
required not only quantitative estimates of production relationships and demand and 
supply levels but also a knowledge of policy parameters including relative weights on 
social goals. The information m a y or m a y not be available. If it is, so m u c h the better. 
9 / P r i m a r y p r o d u c t i o n i s l a g g i n g a n d t o v a r y i n g d e g r e e s c o n s c i o u s l y n e g l e c t e d i n m a n y L a t i n A m e r i c a n 
c o u n t r i e s b e c a u s e d e m a n d i s b e l i e v e d t o b e i n e l a s t i c a n d b e c a u s e o f t h e o c c a s i o n a l l y a d v e r s e h i s t o r i c a l 
e x p e r i e n c e w i t h t h e b e h a v i o r o f t h e t e r m s o f t r a d e b e t w e e n i n d u s t r i a l a n d p r i m a r y p r o d u c t s . T h e s e 
c o n c e r n s m a y b e r e l e v a n t o n l y a s l o n g a s t h e c o u n t r i e s o f t h e R e g i o n m a i n t a i n b i l a t e r a l i n t e r n a t i o n a l t r a d e 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h a r d c u r r e n c y a r e a s . I f t h e R e g i o n w e r e u n i t e d s o t h a t t h e v e r t i c a l i n t e g r a t i o n o f p r i m a r y 
a n d m a n u f a c t u r i n g p r o d u c t i o n w o u l d b e p o s s i b l e o n a n i n t r a r e g i o n a l b a s i s , t h e a d v a n t a g e s o f t h e p r o c e s s i n g 
o f p r i m a r y p r o d u c t s a n d r e l a t e d m a n u f a c t u r i n g w o u l d a c c r u e t o t h e p r o d u c e r s i n t h e R e g i o n . M o r e o v e r , 
t h e a d v e r s e i n c o m e e l a s t i c i t y e s t i m a t e s o f t h e d e m a n d f o r f o o d a n d o t h e r a g r i c u l t u r a l o u t p u t s m a y b e o f 
l e s s e r c o n c e r n t o a d e v e l o p m e n t s t r a t e g y w h i c h a i m s t o c h a n g e t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f i n c o m e . T h e p o i n t i s 
t h a t t h e l a r g e p o p u l a t i o n s e g m e n t s i n t h e l o w e s t i n c o m e g r o u p s n e c e s s a r i l y h a v e a h i g h e r i n c o m e e l a s t i c i t y 
f o r f o o d a n d s t a p l e s t h a n t h e h i g h e r i n c o m e g r o u p s , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t i n c o m e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n w o u l d b o o s t 
t h e R e g i o n a l d e m a n d f o r s t a p l e s e v e n i f t o t a l R e g i o n a l i n c o m e w e r e t o r e m a i n c o n s t a n t . P o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h 
w i t h i n t h e R e g i o n a n d i n t h e r e s t o f t h e w o r l d c a n a l s o b e e x p e c t e d t o a d d t o d e m a n d . F i n a l l y , t h e u p g r a d i n g 
o f p r o d u c t i o n f r o m s t a p l e s t o g e n e r a l l y i n c o m e e l a s t i c a g r i c u l t u r a l o u t p u t s , i . e . , f r u i t s a n d v e g e t a b l e s , i s 
a l s o f e a s i b l e i f s u f f i c i e n t R e g i o n a l d e m a n d c a n b e g e n e r a t e d . 
1 0 / T h e l o w i n c o m e g r o u p s o f t h e R e g i o n c o n s i s t o f t h e r u r a l u n d e r e m p l o y e d - t h e s u b s i s t e n c e f a r m e r a n d l a n d -
l e s s f a r m w o r k e r - a n d t h e u n s k i l l e d m i g r a n t s l i v i n g o n t h e f r i n g e s o f t h e u r b a n i n d u s t r i a l o r c o m m e r c i a l 
e c o n o m y . T h e s i z e o£ t h e s e g r o u p s v a r i e s f r o m c o u n t r y t o c o u n t r y , b u t i t i s a s i g n i f i c a n t p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e 
a c t i v e p o p u l a t i o n a l m o s t e v e r y w h e r e w i t h i n t h e R e g i o n . S i n c e t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l m e a n s f o r i n c o m e r e d i s t r i b u -
t i o n o n t h e r e q u i s i t e m a s s i v e s c a l e d o n o t e x i s t in a n y c o u n t r y i n L a t i n A m e r i c a , t h e o n l y e f f e c t i v e m e a n s 
w o u l d b e t o i n c r e a s e t h e r a t e o f e m p l o y m e n t a t m i n i m u m a c c e p t a b l e w a g e l e v e l s . T h e n , i f t h e d e m a n d f o r 
a n d h e n c e t h e r e l a t i v e s c a r c i t y o f u n s k i l l e d l a b o r i s i n c r e a s e d , t h e m a r k e t m e c h a n i s m i t s e l f i s m a d e t o 
c o n t r i b u t e t o e f f e c t i v e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , g i v e n a s t r a t e g y a i m e d a t i n c r e a s i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l 
p r o d u c t i o n , t h e level of w a g e c o n s u m p t i o n - a c o n s t r a i n t o n t h e r a t e o f e m p l o y m e n t i n c o u n t r i e s w h e r e l a b o r 
p r o d u c t i v i t y i s l o w - c a n b e r a i s e d p a r i p a s s u w i t h t h e g r o w t h o f t h e e m p l o y e d l a b o r f o r c e . 
But if it is not, the implication is not that a rigorous analytical approach can be neglected 
and that some c o m m o n sense method can be adopted. Here a very strong warning is in 
order. As is perhaps unrealized even by their proponents, c o m m o n sense approaches 
are also based on s o m e underlying sets of assumptions the consistency and validity of 
which cannot be tested as long as they remain implicit. C o m m o n sense can frequently 
be misleading and the less empirical information there is available the m o r e important 
it is to be meticulous in the analytical approach. 
Analytical project valuation relies on model building the purpose of which is to 
approximate the conditions surrounding a particular situation or problem. Thus even 
the simplest models from which criteria for project valuation are to be derived must 
be descriptive of conditions prevailing in the country where they are to be applied. 
The simplest model corresponds to an analogue of a competitive free market 
system and its significance lies in the fact that the widely used and frequently recom-
mended methods of valuation based on commercial profitability are related to it. These 
consist of the measurement of a project's private profitability over time accounted in 
terms of existing or estimated market prices and discounted by the market rate of 
interest (frequently -and wrongly- by the arbitrary rate paid to a lending agency). If the 
present discounted value of the market benefits exceeds the costs, the project is consid-
ered profitable. Ideally, several or m a n y projects should be evaluated in order to select, 
in descending order, those which show the most favorable cost-benefit relationships . 
In reality, however, there seems to be a paucity of relevant alternatives, and the method 
is frequently used to justify single projects without comparisons. 
Though variations of this method are widely practiced and are believed to be the 
"hard headed" approach to project selection by those who would equate commercial 
profitability with social welfare, it can be relevant only under certain very limited 
conditions. The reasons are important to analyze because they provide an insight into 
the most basic problems of project valuation. 
The objection against reliance on the free market model is the implicit assumption 
that the satisfaction of private preferences (maximization of individual utilities) neces-
sarily leads to the highest social good. This m a y be the case only if the conditions for 
pure competition prevail (in the absence of increasing returns to scale and certain exter-
nalities), if social preferences coincide with private ones and if the existing distribution 
of income is socially optimal . These conditions patently do not hold for a number of 
reasons, one of the most important being the inequality of income between rent earners, 
wage earners and chronically unemployed or underemployed labor to which reference 
was m a d e in the previous section. 
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Commercial Profit Maximization as Basis for Valuation 
Only under particular circumstances can commercial profit maximization and the use of 
free market prices lead to socially optimal project valuation. This would be the case if 
in an unemployment economy the social purpose were to attain the highest possible rate 
of economic growth -or the fastest route to full employment- without regard to current 
welfare. Then -if pure competition prevailed-the function of profits would be to generate 
investable surpluses and that of consumption to sustain the labor force needed for 
production. However, if profits were not reinvested but squandered on conspicuous 
consumption or moved abroad, the relevance of the model would be destroyed. 
In any event such a model depicts a rather stark world in which the different 
social groups forego current satisfactions in the interest of rapid development. It is 
unlikely that close historical examples exist, and such as there are would be confined to 
linnited periods in 19th Century England, the Soviet Union before the war and perhaps to 
postwar Japan. Capitalists -private or state- must be bent on accumulation and labor 
must accept a wage rate which is defined by some concept of a subsistance m i n i m u m 
(e. g. sueldo vital). Then, the highest growth rate consistent with that wage and the 
level of employment are determined by competitive free market hiring. \XJ 
Thus from a social welfare point of view the uses of free market prices for project 
valuation in an economy where underemployment is chronically significant, implies the 
sacrifice of current welfare for the welfare of future generations. Its very starkness is 
such that no humanistically oriented society could readily accept it. Certainly, the 
implied puritanic form of entrepreneurship and the requisite political control of labor 
would be alien to Latin societies. There is nonetheless, one very important reason 
why in the context of project valuation the lessons of the free market model should be 
kept in mind. If sufficient institutional means for income redistribution in favor of the 
underemployed do not exist -which, as mentioned above, is the case in Latin America -
the rapid creation of new employment opportunities over time m a y be the only effective 
1 1 / S e e L e f e b e r a n d C h a k r a v a r t y [ 5 ] . T o t h e e x t e n t t h a t l a b o r d o e s h a v e t h e p o l i t i c a l p o w e r t o f o r c e w a g e s 
u p w a r d ( w h i c h i s t h e c a s e in many p a r t s o f L a t i n A m e r i c a ) t h e c h o i c e m a y b e b e t w e e n h i g h e r c u r r e n t 
c o n s u m p t i o n f o r t h e e m p l o y e d at t h e e x p e n s e o f c u r r e n t t o t a l e m p l o y m e n t . In a n y c a s e , t h e r a t e o f e c o n o m i c 
g r o w t h w o u l d b e d i m i n i s h e d a n d t h e r a t e o f a b s o r b i n g u n e m p l o y m e n t w o u l d b e c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y s l o w e d d o w n . 
I f l a b o r d o e s n o t s a v e , a h i g h e r w a g e r a t e n e c e s s a r i l y m e a n s a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e d e m a n d f o r c o n s u m e r g o o d 
p r o d u c t i o n a n d a c u t i n t h e r a t e o f i n v e s t m e n t ; h e n c e , t h e i n d u c e d c h a n g e i n t h e c u r r e n t l e v e l o f e m p l o y m e n t 
i s u l t i m a t e l y d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e r e l a t i v e f a c t o r i n t e n s i t i e s i n i n v e s t m e n t a n d c o n s u m e r g o o d p r o d u c t i o n . 
T h i s p o i n t s u p t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f c o n s i d e r i n g t h e c h o i c e o f t e c h n o l o g y : i f i n v e s t m e n t i s m o r e l a b o r i n t e n s i v e 
t h a n c o n s u m e r g o o d s - w h i c h c a n b e t h e c a s e i f , f o r e x a m p l e , c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d e a r t h w o r k s a r e i m p o r t a n t 
c o m p o n e n t s o f i n v e s t m e n t - a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e w a g e r a t e m a y d e c r e a s e c u r r e n t e m p l o y m e n t . H o w e v e r , i f 
r e l a t i v e i n t e n s i t i e s a r e r e v e r s e d , t h e o p p o s i t e m a y b e t h e c a s e . F o r r i g o r o u s d i s c u s s i o n s e e L e f e b e r [ 2 ] . 
long run means for improving social justice. \3J However, if a m o r e hiimanis tic ally 
oriented set of social preferences is selected, there still remains the immediate conflict 
between current welfare (redistributed consumption) and the capacity to increase the 
rate of growth of employment. This can be analyzed only by scrutinizing the relationship 
between wages, technology, emoloyment, consumption, and growth. 
Weighting of Current Weifare as weli as Growth 
If the free market valuation aimed at attaining the highest possible growth rate is too 
extreme -and there is little doubt that this is so- the level of current as well as future 
redistributed consumption must be included in the social welfare function with a positive 
weight. In countries with a high rate of underemployment this must logivally manifest 
itself by higher levels of current consumption by the lowest income groups. Hence, the 
output of consumer goods must be increased relative to new investment and the increment 
in consumption output must be m a d e available to the low income earners, 
If current income and hence consumption redistribution can be accomplished only 
by increasing the current rate of employment, a free market allocation of resources m a y 
not be equal to the task. Assuming that the wage rate is maintained at an institutional 
m i n i m u m level, the market -determined employment of labor would have to be such as 
to equate labor's marginal product to that wage rate. Hence, as long as the stock of 
capital and other resources remains constant and the wage rate remains the same, 
employment in the economy cannot be increased above the free market rate without a 
loss in profits which private owners of capital would not want to incur. 14/ 
Thus if the social priorities indicate a positive weight on current consumption 
combined with redistribution -as one can infer from political pronouncements to be the 
case in Latin America- government intervention m a y be needed to decrease the capital-
labor ratio, as the unaided free market cannot be expected to bring about such a change. 
Even if the elasticity to change the capital-labor ratio in existing installations is limited, 
1 2 / B u t , i n a n y c a s e , t h i s a r g u m e n t i n f a v o r o f t h e c o m p e t i t i v e f r e e m a r k e t a p p r o a c h i s d e s t r o y e d i f c o n s u m p t i o n 
a s f u n c t i o n o f p r o f i t s i s s i g n i f i c a n t . 
1 3 / C o n s u m p t i o n , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , i s u n d e r s t o o d t o i n c l u d e a l s o s u c h s o c i a l s e r v i c e s a s h e a l t h c a r e a n d e d u c a t i o n . 
1 4 / S e e L e f e b e r [ 2 ] . T h e a r g u m e n t c o u l d b e m a d e t h a t s u c h a n a p p r o a c h i s r e l e v a n t o n l y i n c o u n t r i e s i n w h i c h 
u n e m p l o y m e n t o r u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t p r e v a i l s . T h i s i s t r u e . H o w e v e r , t h e R e g i o n i n i t s t o t a l i t y h a s s i z e a b l e 
l a b o r r e s e r v e s i n t h e f o r m o f a g r i c u l t u r a l u n d e r e m p l o y m e n t w h i c h c o u l d b e m a d e a v a i l a b l e t o s p e c i f i c l a b o r 
s h o r t a g e a r e a s t h r o u g h m i g r a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e l a b o r f o r c e p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s a r e g e n e r a l l y l o w 
t h r o u g h o u t t h e R e g i o n a n d t h e s e w o u l d a u t o m a t i c a l l y g r o w i f t h e d e m a n d f o r l a b o r w o u l d i n c r e a s e . In 
p a r t i c u l a r , i n c r e a s e s i n f e m a l e e m p l o y m e n t c o u l d a u g m e n t t h e t o t a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n r a t e s b y a s m u c h a s 
t h i r t y p e r c e n t o r m o r e . 
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public and private entrepreneurs would have to be motivated to lower the capital-labor 
ratios at least in new undertakings. 
Since the preceeding arguments have a bearing on project design as well as on 
valuation, it is useful to bring up the question of commercial efficiency. It is well-known 
that Latin American manufacturing enterprises are frequently inefficient and unable to 
break into international markets. This, of course, can have many causes, such as a lack 
of rigorous managerial practices or insufficient technological preparedness. But assuming 
that these can be overcome, the question still remains: What is the proper technology 
for a Latin American enterprise? As suggested above, those who favor criteria based 
on commercial profitability would recommend a profit maximizing choice of technology. 
But profit maximization in terms of what prices? It is clear that private enterprise 
in general will not want to sacrifice profits for some intangible concept of social 
welfare. Furthermore, production decisions and project valuation in a free market 
system are naturally carried out in terms of actual prices. And yet, should a private 
entrepreneur be permitted or even encouraged to select a capital intensive mode 
of technology in a country with an incipient abundance of labor -if that happens to be the 
profit maximizing choice of technology- because the institutional m i n i m u m wage rate is 
in excess of labor's marginal product for more labor intensive technologies ? This is 
not an easy question to answer. The social good m a y be best served if current unemploy-
ment is diminished by labor intensive patterns of production. At the same time, 
profitability and the need to compete in free markets m a y require -given the actual 
prices confronting the entrepreneur- a more capital intensive technology. The problem 
is then, could the price system be so adjusted as to coordinate social interests and 
private profitability and could that same price system be used also to reward private 
entrepreneurs for being both commercially efficient and contributing to the social good ? 
The answer is yes if the difference between free market prices and the socially optimal 
price structure can be determined. 
Consider the difference between the private and social cost of, or private and 
social benefit from hiring a unit of labor. The private cost of labor is the wage rate the 
employer must pay and the private benefit is the increment in output (revenue)the 
employer obtains from hiring the last unit of labor. The social cost of the last unit of 
labor is the value of the added resources needed to sustain it and the social benefit is 
the sum of the increment in social welfare due to the increase in redistributed consump-
tion and of the private benefit which accrues to the employer. Thus, a social valuation 
must include along with the private benefits also the value of redistributed consumption 
or must subtract the latter from the private cost of hiring labor. The greater the weight 
placed on the current levels of employment and consumption as opposed to their rates of 
growth, the greater the gap between the social and free market valuation of a project's 
profitability because of the difference in the valuation of the added demand for employment 
created by the project. 
The social valuation of redistributed consumption and hence the social valuation of 
employment must naturally vary from country to country depending on economic conditions 
and social priorities. But one thing can be stated with certainty: as long as there is an 
abundance of low productivity labor and current welfare as well as growth is positively 
valued, the choice of projects and technology must be directed toward more employment 
creation and higher labor intensities than would be the case if commercial efficiency in 
a free market were the basis for valuation. The implication is that the employment 
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consequences of alternative projects should be scrutinized and that engineering plans for 
each project should present alternative technologies. Then, from the alternatives, those 
projects and technologies can be selected which in terms of the particular country's or 
countries priorities appear to be most desirable. 
Accordingly, if publicly sponsored integration projects are to be designed to 
reflect social preferences as to redistributed consumption, the capacity to create new 
employment opportunities -be it through a higher labor-capital ratio or through the' 
opening up of frontier regions for new employment or through other means - must be 
prominent among the selection criteria. Furthermore, the induced secondary, tertiary, 
etc. , net increments in employment must also be accounted for along with all other 
private and public benefits. 
8 
Shadow Pricing when the Rate of Empioyment 
is Limited by the Supply of Wage Goods ii/ 
The social valuation of all goods and services -including labor's contribution to welfare-
can be obtained only through shadow pricing. If in a purely competitive free market 
economy the allocation of resources happens to be socially optimal, then the shadow 
prices correspond to the free market prices. More generally, however, shadow prices 
have a meaning if and only if there is a clearly articulated and properly weighted set of 
social goals -a welfare function which is to be maximized subject to prevailing resource 
limitations and technological, political and other constraints. Then, the shadow price 
of an activity -output or service- can be defined as the change or increment in the value 
of the welfare function obtained in response to a small (unit) increase in that same 
activity. Any reference to shadow pricing outside such a framework is meaningless. 
Asimple and empirically applicable welfare function is of a type where a constant 
proportion of the socially valued income is spent on consumption and investment, the 
constant of proportionality being a politically determined parameter. lé/ The latter IS 
equivalent to a relátive weight on current consumption and investment. If the scale of 
the welfare function is so specified that the increments in welfare are measurable in 
money units, then total welfare can be expressed in terms of national income and the 
constant of proportionality represents the social rate of saving. Current consumption 
and investment -the latter representing growth- being the two arguments of the welfare 
function, the shadow prices of current consumption and investment are determined by 
1 5 / S e e t h e A p p e n d i x f o r a n i l l u s t r a t i v e m o d e l in w h i c h c o n s u m p t i o n c o n s t r a i n s t h e r a t e o f e m p l o y m e n t . 
1 6 / T h e p r o p o r t i o n , o f c o u r s e , c a n b e a d j u s t e d o v e r t i m e . S e e r e l a t i o n s h i p ( 1 ) i n A p p e n d i x . 
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their respective marginal contributions to the value of the welfare function. In other 
words, the welfare value of consumption is the ratio of the increment in total welfare to 
an increment in consumer good input. The welfare valuation of investment is analogous. 
In the context of an underemployment economy, where the real wage rate paid to 
employed labor directly translates itself into consumption, one can think of consumer 
good production as fulfilling two functions: first, as above, of contributing directly to 
current welfare to the extent of the social weight placed on current consumption and 
second, of providing sustenance to the labor force qua input into the production process. 
Since the welfare valuation of the consumer good as defined above accounts only 
for its direct contribution to current welfare, there must be an added component to the 
total valuation of the consumer good for its use as input in current production, including 
that of investment undertaken for future welfare. The two component shadow prices -the 
welfare valuation and the input valuation- add up to the total shadow price or optimal 
market valuation of the consumer good, i. e. , that price which is needed to bring forth 
the last unit of the optimal consumer good output. It is clear that the greater the relative 
weight on current consumption in the welfare function, the greater must be the welfare 
valuation relative to the input valuation of the consumer good and vice versa. 
If society places no weight on current cc.isumption per se, then the welfare 
valuation of current consumption is zero and the market price of the consumer good 
coincides with its input valuation. This gives the clue to the shadow valuation of labor, 
i. e. , the shadow wage rate. Specifically, when focus is on growth alone, then the real 
wage -labor's consumption- is valued in terms of the competitive free market price of 
the consumer good;hence,competitive free market pricing brings about socially desirable 
results and -given that other required market conditions are met- commercial efficiency 
coincides with social efficiency. On the other hand, when some positive weight is placed 
on current redistributed consumption per se, then by the above argument, the input 
valuation of consumer goods must be smaller than the market price. In that case the 
shadow wage rate is smaller than the market wage rate; hence, the corresponding 
socially desirable capital-labor ratio is smaller and total employment is greater than 
what free market efficiency would imply. Under these conditions free market allocation 
or commercial efficiency is inconsistent with social efficiency; hence government 
intervention is needed to motivate profit maximizing producers to use resources in a 
socially desirable manner. In such cases, short of direct controls, payroll subsidies or 
other appropriate means are indicated for increasing the private returns to added 
employment and hence, the labor-capital ratio. 
The previous analysis focuses on the balance between current and future welfare 
or current redistributed consumption and investment. Let there be no question about it: 
the determination of the appropriate rate of social time preference is the heart of the 
planning problem in all fully or partially planned economies. The analysis, which has 
already yielded a basic operational concept (the shadow wage rate with its implications 
for project selection), also provides the means for relating the social time preference to 
project selection. Specifically, it yields a concept of the social rate of discount which 
is needed to compare the costs and benefits accruing to different projects over time. 
There is a school of thought according to which the social rate of discount is 
naturally zero because a homogeneous society with a continous existence naturally places 
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the same weight on tomorrow's consumption as on today's. However, a decision on the 
balancing of current consumption and investment in itself reveals preferences concerning 
the trade-off between the different welfare levels at different time periods. Correspond-
ingly, the model outlined above yields a discount rate which is not independent of the rate 
of growth indicated by social priorities. 
As was the case with the shadow wage rate, the social rate of discount could 
coincide with the private free market rate if in the interest of growth no weight were to 
be placed on current welfare. However, if current redistributed consumption is positively 
weighted in the welfare function, the social rate of discount must necessarily be less than 
what the free market rate would be. Hence, the free market rate of interest is relevant 
for discounting only if all the weight is on growth. Otherwise -which would be the 
normal case in a humanistically oriented society- the relevant rate of discount is smaller 
than the free market rate. 
The social rate of discount and the shadow wage rate are the twoprimary expres-
sions of social preferences. In addition, of course, as m a n y shadow prices can be 
derived as desired degrees of sectoral disaggregation. In general, however, shadow 
prices can be applied to project valuation only if they refer to highly specific activities, 
e. g. , the use or earning of foreign exchange. The corresponding shadow rate can readily 
be interpreted as the measure of the relative social scarcity of foreign exchange. 
Secondary Social Goals 
There are certain activities which are so strategic to the attainment of basic welfare 
goals that they can be thought of as if they were goals. These can be referred to as 
secondary goals. Improvement in the efficiency of industry and agriculture, improve-
ment in the balance of payments and hedging against future contingencies in a world of 
uncertainty -to mention a few- come under this heading. 
As was the case in the previous section the need for shadow pricing m a y arise 
because of the divergence between the free market and socially desirable outcomes in an 
otherwise perfect world. But if markets are imperfect, if prices are distorted and 
production is inefficient, shadow pricing can also be used as the basis for correcting the 
existing price structure. 
The primary sources of distortion are feudal or other non-competitive agricul-
tural practices, monopolistic market forms and certain government policies. Of the 
latter, the overvaluation of the domestic currencies m a y be the single most important 
cause of distortion in resource allocation. Even if the exchange rate is set to clear the 
market, if protection is needed to maintain clearing, the rate m a y not correspond to its 
social scarcity. If due to inflationary or other reasons the controlled rate gets out of 
line with what is maintainable in the long run, the substitution of a shadow rate for the 
14 
of f ic ia l rate b e c o m e s m a n d a t o r y in p r o j e c t valuation. To i l lustrate the c a s e , one has 
only to r e f e r to p r o j e c t s which on the b a s i s of o f f i c i a l - h e n c e , c o m m e r c i a l - valuation turn 
f r o m prof i table to unprof i table (or v ice v e r s a ) at the s troke of midnight on the day of 
devaluation. In contrast , the s o c i a l prof i tabi l i ty computed on the b a s i s of shadow r a t e s 
is insens i t ive to a r b i t r a r y rate changes . i_Z / 
I m p r o v e m e n t s in e c o n o m i c e f f i c i e n c y in Latin A m e r i c a a r e s u f f i c i e n t l y important 
so as to include e f f i c i e n c y per se among the s e c o n d a r y g o a l s . To the extent that a p r o j e c t 
has an important i m p a c t on e f f i c i e n c y in industry or a g r i c u l t u r e , the value of the e s t i m a t e d 
net i m p r o v e m e n t s (the induced d e c r e a s e s in the m a r g i n a l c o s t s of production) m u s t be 
accounted for along with the p r i m a r y benef i ts . Since integration p r o j e c t s m a y l o g i c a l l y 
be of that type which can s igni f icant ly add to the g e n e r a l level of e f f i c i e n c y , this m u s t be 
kept in m i n d as it m a y m a k e the d i f f e r e n c e between the acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of the 
p r o j e c t in question. T r a n s p o r t a t i o n and c o m m u n i c a t i o n p r o j e c t s p a r t i c u l a r l y need to be 
scrut in ized f r o m this point of view. 
T h e r e a r e certa in act iv i t ies - e i t h e r of a purely pol i t ical nature or re lat ing to 
nonquantifiable a s p e c t s of s o c i a l w e l f a r e - w h o s e valuation in t e r m s of their quantitative 
contribution to soc ia l goals m a y not be f e a s i b l e . T h e nonquantif iable benef i ts m u s t not 
be n e g l e c t e d in p r o j e c t valuation, though it a l s o should be kept in m i n d that nonquantif iable 
soc ia l p u r p o s e s m a y be i m p r o p e r l y u s e d to j u s t i f y p r o j e c t s which as ide f r o m short t e r m 
expediency provide no s igni f icant benef i ts . 
Goals which a r e di f f icult to weigh or evaluate are n u m e r o u s and only a f e w wi l l 
be mentioned. A s m e n t i o n e d e a r l i e r , Latin A m e r i c a n integration m a y have a po l i t ica l 
value per se which could lend added i m p o r t a n c e to p r o j e c t s leading to integrat ion. It is 
not p o s s i b l e to say , h o w e v e r , how a qualitative weight t r a n s l a t e s in a m e a s u r a b l e 
magnitude . 
A m o r e tangible but f r o m the point of view of quantif ication sti l l d i f f icult p r o b l e m 
r e l a t e s to hedging against f o r e i g n exchange l o s s e s . R e l i a n c e on a s ingle or a few f o r e i g n 
exchange s o u r c e s m a y be inadvisable . At the s a m e t i m e , d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n has its c o s t s 
in the s e n s e that the var iance in f o r e i g n exchange earnings m a y be r e d u c e d only by 
accepting a l o w e r e x p e c t e d value of f o r e i g n exchange i n c o m e and even national i n c o m e . 
H o w e v e r , the t r a d e - o f f s cannot be quantif ied without a knowledge of probabi l i ty d i s t r i -
butions and s p e c i f i c s o c i a l r i s k p r e f e r e n c e s . 
1 7 / T h e v a l u a t i o n o f p r o j e c t s r e q u i r i n g o r p r o d u c i n g l a r g e a m o u n t s o f f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e i l l u s t r a t e s t h e d i f f e r e n c e 
b e t w e e n p r i m a r y a n d s e c o n d a r y g o a l s . T h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f a p r o j e c t t o w a r d t h e p r i m a r y g o a l s i s v a l u e d i n 
t e r m s o f t h e r e l a t i v e w e i g h t p l a c e d o n the g o a l i t s e l f . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n o f t h e p r o j e c t t o 
a s e c o n d a r y g o a l - s u c h a s f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e e a r n i n g s - i s v a l u e d i n t e r m s o f t h e s o c i a l s c a r c i t y o f f o r e i g n 
e x c h a n g e e x p r e s s e d b y t h e s h a d o w r a t e . 
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Shadow Pricing of l\^ulti-national Investments 
T h e p r e v i o u s a n a l y s i s a s s u m e s that the i n v e s t m e n t f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p r o j e c t i s 
l o c a t e d in a s i n g l e c o u n t r y . H o w e v e r , i n t e g r a t i o n p r o j e c t s - s u c h a s t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n w o r k s - m a y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y r e q u i r e i n v e s t m e n t s o r s e r v i c e s which 
a r e d i s t r i b u t e d o v e r s e v e r a l c o u n t r i e s . What a r e then the r e l e v a n t p r i n c i p l e s of p r o j e c t 
v a l u a t i o n ? T h i s i s an i m p o r t a n t p r o b l e m s i n c e the b e n e f i t s a c c r u i n g to a c o u n t r y m a y 
not b e p r o p o r t i o n a t e to the c o s t s of the p r o j e c t i n c u r r e d w i t h i n the s a m e c o u n t r y . H e n c e , 
t h e r e i s the q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r i t i s p o s s i b l e to d e v i s e an e q u i t a b l e p l a n f o r the f i n a n c i n g 
of and l o a n r e p a y m e n t on m u l t i - n a t i o n a l p r o j e c t s . 
T h e a n s w e r d e p e n d s on the r e l e v a n t c o n c e p t of i n t e g r a t i o n . In the c a s e of a 
c o m p l e t e p o l i t i c a l - e c o n o m i c union c h a r a c t e r i z e d by a u n i q u e s u p r a n a t i o n a l w e l f a r e 
f u n c t i o n and by f r e e m o v e m e n t of l a b o r and o t h e r f a c t o r s , a s i n g l e s e t o f s h a d o w p r i c e s 
w o u l d be r e l e v a n t f o r a l l c o u n t r i e s . On the o t h e r hand, i f w e l f a r e i s m a x i m i z e d on the 
a s s u m p t i o n t h a t w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t of i n t e g r a t i o n e a c h p a r t i c u l a r c o u n t r y m a i n t a i n s i t s 
own d i s t i n c t w e l f a r e f u n c t i o n , the s h a d o w w a g e r a t e , the d i s c o u n t r a t e and - d e p e n d i n g on 
the p a y m e n t s a n d c l e a r i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s - the s h a d o w rates o f f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e a r e 
n e c e s s a r i l y d i f f e r e n t in e a c h c o u n t r y . F u r t h e r m o r e , w h i l e with i n c r e a s i n g R e g i o n a l 
t r a d e the p r i c e s of m o s t g o o d s a n d s e r v i c e s m i g h t in the long run c o n v e r g e t o w a r d a 
un ique l e v e l ( e x c e p t f o r d i f f e r e n t i a l s c a u s e d by t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and o t h e r f r i c t i o n s ) a s long 
a s s o c i a l w e l f a r e p r i o r i t i e s d i f f e r , the s o c i a l d i s c o u n t r a t e s and the s h a d o w w a g e r a t e s 
w i l l h a v e to r e m a i n d i f f e r e n t f r o m c o u n t r y to c o u n t r y . 
It i s r e a s o n a b l e to a s s u m e that f o r the f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e the l a t t e r w i l l b e the 
c a s e . T h i s m e a n s tha t the n e t b e n e f i t s a c c r u i n g to e a c h c o u n t r y f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r 
m u l t i - n a t i o n a l p r o j e c t would h a v e to b e v a l u e d d i f f e r e n t l y and tha t the b u r d e n of f i n a n c i n g 
w o u l d h a v e to be a l l o c a t e d a c c o r d i n g to a c o s t - b e n e f i t c o m p u t a t i o n w h i c h i s b a s e d on a 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y d i f f e r e n t s e t o f s h a d o w p r i c e s in e a c h a f f e c t e d c o u n t r y . T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e 
o f s u c h a p r o c e d u r e i s r e a d i l y i l l u s t r a t e d by a n y m u l t i - n a t i o n a l p r o j e c t wi th p o t e n t i a l l y 
h i g h b a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s e f f e c t s on the p a r t i c i p a n t s . If in e a c h c o u n t r y the p r o j e c t ' s 
d i r e c t a n d i n d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n to the b a l a n c e of p a y m e n t s i s not v a l u e d a c c o r d i n g to the 
s o c i a l s c a r c i t y o f the f o r e i g n e x c h a n g e - w h i c h w i l l be d i f f e r e n t in e a c h p a r t i c i p a t i n g 
c o u n t r y - the b u r d e n of d e b t s e r v i c e a n d r e p a y m e n t w i l l be u n j u s t l y d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g the 
p a r t i c i p a n t s . 
1 6 
10 
Estimation of Shadow Prices 
Though the qualitative use of shadow prices in itself provides useful insights into the 
principles of project valuation (e. g. , the relationship between social goals and choice of 
technology), actual valuation requires quantitative estimates. The information from 
which such estimates can be derived is at best weak and this part of the exercise must be 
handled with caution. Apart from the insufficiency of data, in countries with steady 
inflationary pressures actual market prices, wages, rents and interests cannot be m a d e 
use of without suitable deflation for estimating the real magnitudes needed for valuation. 
The problem is compounded by the fact that there is no readily available method to identify 
and separate out the different causes of distortions in the observed price structure 
attributable to inflation, monopolistic influences and government intervention. 
The estimation of shadow prices is, perhaps, the least problematical if the 
emphasis is totally on growth. In that case, as argued above, the relevant rate of 
discount is the market rate of interest and the relevant wage rate is the institutional rate. 
Furthermore, the shadow rate of foreign exchange would correspond to the market 
clearing rate in a competitive free market. There still remains, however, the problem 
of eliminating the inflationary effects so as to obtain that price structure which charac-
terizes the real growth path. The money rate of interest less the percentage rate of 
change in the price level yields the estimate of the discount rate, and the shadow wage 
rate is the real value of the increment in total consumption due to hiring and added unit 
of labor. 
There must be no ambiguity, however, about the meaning of the market rate of 
interest. In any Latin American country there is bound to be a variety of observed 
interest rates ranging from government subsidized development loans to rates on unse-
cured consumption loans. Which one is appropriate? In all probability none. Instead 
this is a matter for estimation. The Fisherian concept of the marginal rate of return 
over cost or the rate of return on new investment gives the relevant magnitude. These 
can be estimated by well-established methods. 
If the social welfare function positively weights current redistributed consumption, 
then the shadow wage rate and the social discount rate will be smaller than the free 
market rate. Their estimation m a y require a complete econometric analysis of the 
structure of the economy. 18/ Another method, based on revealed preferences, for 
1 8 / A q u a n t i t a t i v e g e n e r a l e q u i l i b r i u m a n a l y s i s i s g i v e n in L e f e b e r [ 2 ] a n d a d e m o n s t r a t i o n m o d e l o f s i m i l a r 
s t r u c t u r e i s p r o v i d e d in t h e A p p e n d i x . If s u c h f r a m e w o r k s a r e u s e d f o r e s t i m a t i n g t h e d i s c o u n t r a t e , 
c o n s u m p t i o n b y t h e o w n e r s o f c a p i t a l h a s t o b e e x p l i c i t y i n t r o d u c e d . T h i s i s n o t a t a l l d i f f i c u l t i f t h e n o t 
u n r e a l i s t i c a s s u m p t i o n i s m a d e t h a t c a p i t a l i s t s ' c o n s u m p t i o n v a r i e s w i t h t h e s t o c k o f c a p i t a l a n d n o t w i t h 
p r o f i t s . 
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estimating a relevant range of discount rates has been suggested by Marglin. If planners 
can identify alternative feasible time paths for aggregate consumption, then tne relevant 
range of social discount rates is the one for which the present discounted value of the 
most preferred path is higher than for all other alternatives. 
The estimation of the shadow rate of foreign exchange is not m o r e straight-
forward, since there is no direct indication of what the hypothetical competitive free 
market scarcity would amount to. The gray or blackmarket rate m a y provide an estimate 
but its relevance depends on the proportion of the total foreign exchange transactions 
which go through the market. In those countries where foreign exchange is controlled, 
that proportion m a y be quite small. Hence, the observed free market rate would not be 
indicative of the relative scarcity in the entire economy. 
A m o r e relevant approach consists of measuring the productivity of foreign 
exchange as input of production. Specifically, one can estimate the present discounted 
value in domestic currency of an income stream generated by, say, one hundred dollars' 
worth of imported capital goods. Then, the ratio of this discounted income stream to 
the dollar value of the imported capital goods gives an estimate of the shadow rate of 
foreign exchange. The rationale of this approach is that in an efficient market system 
the importation of capital goods would be carried to the point where such an activity is 
no longer profitable. Notice, however, that the method relies on a present discounted 
value estimate; hence, it requires the use of a discount rate. Furthermore, since 
imported capital goods seldom can be used by themselves to generate income, but must 
be incorporated into an investment scheme which includes buildings and other domestic 
components, an estimate of the imputed income shares is also necessary. As an alter-
native along similar lines, the present discounted value of the increment to the total 
consumption stream in response to a unit import would also yield an estimate. 
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Projects Affecting the Structure of the Economy 
Some integration projects m a y be of such size and influence that they m a y importantly 
affect production relationships in one or m o r e sectors or countries. This m a y be the 
case with very large multi-purpose projects of water control which m a y discontinuously 
change transportation and power capacities as well as the supply of cultivable land. In 
such cases the principles of shadow pricing, as discussed in the previous sections, 
become irrelevant. Shadow pricing is derived from a logical framework applicable to 
continous marginal changes. If discontinuity is induced, if constraints are shifted by 
discreet intervals, then valuation must be based on some other principle. This is so 
because the discontinous structural changes cause changes in the universe itself. In 
other words, the set of shadow prices which correspond to an economy described by a 
particular set of constraints cannot be used for the valuation of a particular project in 
the altered economy which is described by a different set of constraints. 
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This is not to say that projects of this character should not be evaluated. However, 
instead of relying on marginalist methods, the proper question is as follows: given that 
there are resources for the discontinous displacement of one or m o r e of the constraints 
on the economy, what are the alternatives? In other words, what must be searched for 
is not the best position on a given feasibility surface -which can be obtained at the margin 
with the help of shadow price based project valuation- but the socially most desirable 
direction of the discontinous change in the shape of the feasibility surface itself. 
Obviously, if social welfare concepts are stable, that discontinous pattern of shifts in 
the constraints is desirable which, given the resource limitations, permits the attainment 
of the highest level of social welfare. But here the standard statistical methods relevant 
to valuation fail (most price parameters are derived from the measurement of margins) 
and the only practicable means of selection m a y consist of submitting all relevant alter-
native projects capable of inducing discontinous changes to a political body for selection. 
Fortunately, it is difficult to conceive of many projects which would have sudden 
discontinous effects on the structure of the economies involved. Large projects which 
are executed over a long time period could result in gradual and continous changes 
so that shadow pricing m a y still be adapted to the particular situation. The problem of 
dealing with increasing returns to scale projects still remains but as long as the scale 
effects are confined to the project itself, i. e. , they are not transmitted to the relevant 
portions of the feasibility surface, social marginal cost pricing retains its validity. It 
should be clear, however, that under those conditions private enterprise can pursue 
a socially desirable course only if it is subsidized and otherwise controlled by the 
government. 
13 
The Choice of Technology 
One of the recommendations which emerges from the discussion of social welfare 
oriented project valuation is the need to consider alternative technologies in the design 
stage. This is so because, as argued above, a positive weight on current welfare m a y 
imply a need for m o r e labor intensive techniques than indicated by free market criteria. 
In project design the choice of technology enters at two interconnected stages. 
First, the method of building or providing the required investment must be considered. 
Second, the technique for the manufacture of the output or provision of the service must 
be determined. As an example, consider the case of a transportation project. The 
construction of the roadbed m a y be undertaken by methods which can range from highly 
labor intensive to highly capital intensive techniques. The service of transportation 
-which relies on the use of the roadbed as well as on other investments in rolling stock 
and maintenance equipment- can also be provided with variable factor proportions. 
It is a shortcoming of actual project design that insufficient attention is given to 
the choice of technology. In this respect, two basic biases can be singled out: a) the 
apparent belief that there is no variability in factor proportions, i. e. , that the capital-
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labor ratios are fixed and that b) the most desirable technology is the one which from 
the engineering point of view is most advanced. Apart from the fact that these two types 
of biases contradict each other, each taken by itself is erroneous. 
It is true that in certain industries -particularly in hydro-electric power and 
certain petro-chemical processes- the adjustment of factor proportions is quite difficult 
and after the installation of the chosen type of investment it m a y even be impossible. 
But in most industries -even inheavy industrial manufacturing units suchas steel plants-
there is scope for variation. If nothing else,, yard operations can always be designed to 
conform to a wide range of capital-labor ratios. In any case, some of the rigidity in 
capital-labor ratios is clearly due to institutional rather than technical conditions. For 
instance, even though a given piece of equipment at a given m o m e n t of time can only be 
used in combination with a single operator, if the rate of output is measured over a time 
interval it becomes evident that the same equipment m a y be profitably exploited with two 
operators in attendance. The speed of machine work which requires physical exertion 
or particular care must correspond to the capacity of a single operator who, if in 
continous attendance over an eight or ten hour workday has to proceed at a sustainable 
rate. On the other hand, if two operators are present, one can be permitted to rest while 
the other is at work so that the rate of output of the active operator can be increased. 19/ 
Except in the case of full automation, any tool or machine from pick and shovel to semi-
automatic equipment can be treated in this manner. Whether it is profitable to do so 
depends on the relative cost of labor and equipment; it is only an institutional bias (or 
puritanical belief) that a worker should not be permitted, let alone encouraged, to take 
frequent rest periods during paid working hours. 
As to the natural propensity of designers to choose that technology which from 
the engineering point of view is the most advanced, it is likely to lead to higher capital-
labor ratios than warranted by actual factor endowments. This is so because new 
techniques developed in already industrialized countries do not relate to Latin American 
economic conditions and m a y even have been developed for labor saving purposes. 
Finally the balance of payments implications of project design must also be 
considered. In general, the greater the capital intensity, the greater will be the pro-
portion of imports in the total investment cost. If the project is evaluated in terms of 
overvalued official exchange rates and market wage rates, the true social cost of the 
capital intensive technology will not register. O n the other hand if the project is valued 
on the basis of proper shadow wages and foreign exchange rates and if the secondary 
benefits are also accounted for, the case in favor of a m o r e labor-intensive technology 
m a y be overwhelming. 
1 9 / I a m indebted to th is e x a m p l e to M r . M. S o l o m o n , at one t i m e with USAID in India. 
¿_0/ L e s s c a p i t a l i n t e n s i v e plant d e s i g n - e . g. , s t e e l p lants bui l t a c c o r d i n g to p r e - S e c o n d W o r l d W a r technology 
i n s t e a d of i n t e g r a t e d c o n t i n o u s p r o c e s s e s - m a y a l s o be m o r e s u i t a b l e in t e r m s of the a v a i l a b i l i t y of 
p a r t i c u l a r t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the e d u c a t i o n a l e f f e c t s of s u i t a b l y c h o s e n t e c h n o l o g y on an 
u n s k i l l e d o r s e m i - s k i l l e d l a b o r f o r c e m u s t not be n e g l e c t e d . I n t e n s i v e u s e of t o o l s and s e m i - a u t o m a t i c 
m a c h i n e r y , a s d i s c u s s e d abo\'e, not only i n c r e a s e s the r a t e of e m p l o y m e n t and output but a l s o r e s u l t s in 
the t r a i n i n g of m o r e s e m i - s k i l l e d o r s k i l l e d m a c h i n e o p e r a t o r s . 
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Appendix 
The text referred to analytical frameworks in which the rate of employment is constrained 
by the supply of consumer goods. Since the discussion was general rather than specific, 
in this Appendix a simplified but fully specified analytical framework is presented. It 
goes without saying that this analytical framework serves only illustrative purposes. 
Though it could be m a d e applicable for deriving rough and ready estimates of m a x i m u m 
attainable growth rates and marginal rates of transformation between consumption and 
investment, the framework itself is too simple to be used for the econometric estimation 
of the parameters needed for project valuation. Furthermore, as will be evident, it 
provides no criteria for the selection of optimal capital labor ratios. It demonstrates, 
however, certain basic logical relationships which are relevant to the argument of the 
paper. Analysis of greater generality can readily be obtained in the sources cited at the 
end of this Appendix. 
The framework to be presented is a fixed coefficient linear programming model. 
Fixed coefficients represent rigid technologies and unless m o r e than one set of fixed 
coefficients is stipulated for each productive process, choice among techniques does not 
exist. However, the inclusion of multiple techniques could be readily accomplished. 
The general form of the welfare function discussed in the text is as follows: 
(1) Y = c(l - P); 0 S p $ 1 
Here Y represents the level of utility and its scale is so chosen as to permit the 
cardinal measurement of social welfare in terms of income. The exponent p represents 
the proportion of investment in the national income and (1 - p) is the proportion of 
consumption. The national income is, of course, measured in terms of welfare prices, 
i.e., shadow prices associated with a particular solution. I and C represent the level 
of net investment and consumption in either physical or constant money units. The 
function in the I, C plane can be represented by a family of hyperbolas which are skewed 
toward the C or I axis according to the chosen value of p. Since the latter must be 
between zero and one, the utility curves in the limit approach a vertical or a horizontal 
line. 
The fixed coefficient approximation of the welfare function described above is 
given by the following two relationships: 
(2) p Y ^ i ; 
(3) (1 - p) Y ^ C 
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A c o m m o n sense way of looking at these relationships is to think of income as if 
it were produced by two inputs: investment and consumption. In other words, the fixed 
coefficient utility function has the exact characteristics of a Leontief type production 
function.^jy 
The analytical framework which delineates the feasible region is given by the 
following six relationships: 
(4) a^I < Li; 
(5) bil 4 Ki; 
(6) a2C 4 Lz; 
(7) b¿C « K^; 
(8) w(L,i + Lz) 4 C; 
(9) Ki + K2 4 K(t) 
(4) and (5) together represent the fixed coefficient production function of invest-
ment and (6) and (7) describe the production function of the consumer good. The a - s 
and b - s represent the labor (L) and capital (K) requirements per unit of output. Subscript 
(1) denotes the coefficients and the inputs in the investment good industry and subscript 
(2) denotes the same in the consumer good industry. 
Relationship (8) shows the total demand for consumer goods as determined by the 
rate of employment, w is an arbitrarily stipulated real wage rate measured in the units 
of the consumer good. Since according to (8) the rate of employment cannot exceed that 
level which in terms of the stipulated m i n i m u m real wage rate can be supplied with 
consumer goods, it is the total supply of consumer goods which limits or constrains the 
rate of employment. 
Relationship (9) shows the distribution of capital. K(t) is the total amount of 
capital available in the economy and in the initial period its quantity is given. Note that 
since the system described by the relationships from (2) to (9) is subject to the law of 
constant returns to scale and capital is the only scarce input, the exact amount of capital 
available in the economy is needed only for determining the absolute values of the 
variables. All relative magnitudes, such as the growth rate or the aggregate capital-
labor ratio (total capital to total employment in the economy) can be derived with arbi-
trarily stipulated initial capital stock values. 
Ziy T h i s f i x e d c o e f f i c i e n t a p p r o x i m a t i o n , i n s t e a d of a s e t of p r i c e l i n e s , i s n e e d e d b e c a u s e in l i n e a r p r o g r a m -
m i n g t h e f e a s i b i l i t y r e g i o n i s d e l i n e a t e d by l i n e a r s e g m e n t s . L i n e a r p r i c e l i n e s , i£ they c o i n c i d e with a 
l i n e a r s e g m e n t , r e s u l t in i n d e t e r m i n a c y o v e r the e n t i r e l ength of that s e g m e n t . D e t e r m i n a t e s o l u t i o n s 
m u s t a l l be c o n f i n e d to v e r t e x po ints . In c o n t r a s t , a f ixed c o e f f i c i e n t u t i l i t y funct ion p e r m i t s a d e t e r m i n a t e 
s o l u t i o n not only at v e r t e x points but a n y w h e r e in b e t w e e n t h e m . 
2 2 
Instead oí a formal linear programming solution, the entire feasibility surface 
can be derived by a process of simple substitutions. Specifically, by substituting (4) and 
(6) into (8) and (5) and (7) into (9), we obtain the following two overall constraints: 
(10) C > ( w a i / l - wa^) 1; 
(11) C ^ K ( t ) / b 2 - ( b j / b p I 
These represent two linear relationships in I and C with parameters composed 
of the coefficients of the six relationships from (4) to (9). 
F i g u r e 
F e a s i b i l i t y Region when the Supply of 
the W a g e Good C o n s t r a i n s E m p l o y m e n t 
The two over-al l constraints can readily be represented diagramatically as 
shown in the Figure. Relationship (11), denoted by the line AD is a simple constraint 
imposed by the scarcity of capital and requires no further interpretation. Relationship 
(10), denoted by OE indicates that, because of the wage demand, the output of the consumer 
good must exceed a given minimimi amount for each rate of investment. The feasible 
minimum rate of consumption on the capital constraint is determined by the intersection 
of (10) and (H) . It corresponds to the wage consumption of that rate of employment 
which is just needed if the highest feasible rate of investment is to be attained. The 
output combination corresponding to the maximum investment point is shown in the 
Figure at point B. Those outputs on relationship (11) which in the diagramatic repre-
sentation are to the right of the intersection denoted by B, i. e. , on segment BD, are 
23 
non-feasible. The feasible region corresponds to the area of the triangle denoted by 
OAB and the efficient combinations of outputs lie on the segment AB shown by the 
heavy line. 
The outputs corresponding to the intersection itself are readily obtained by 
solving (10) and (11). They are given by the following two values: 
_ K(t ) /b2 
I - (wai/1 - wa2) + (bi/b2) ' 
K(t) /b2 
^^ ^^  ^ " 1 + (bi/b2) (1 - wa2)/wai 
(12) provides the value of the maximum feasible rate of investment. (13) provides 
the total consimiption which must be produced in the economy if the rate of investment is 
pushed to its maximiim feasible level. Now the maximum rate of growth -a relative 
magnitude which does not depend on the initial value of the capital stock- can also be 
deduced. By taking the ratio of the maximum feasible rate of investment to the given 
initial capital stock, the maximal growth rate is obtained as follows: 
1 - wa2 
(14) - w a 2 ) bi 
Since the absolute value of K (t) enters both the numerator and the denominator of 
the ratio, it cancels out. Thus the growth rate is shown to depend only on the fixed 
technical coefficients and the wage rate and not on the initial capital stock. 
Notice that as shown by constraint (10), the wage rate and the labor coefficient of 
the consumer good stand in a significant relationship to each other. Specifically, the 
product formed by the wage rate and the labor coefficient of the consumer good must be 
smaller than one. Since the labor coefficient represents the inverse of the average 
product of labor, the condition is that the real wage rate (defined in units of the consumer 
good) must be smaller than the average product of labor. The real wage rate represents 
the marginal demand for consumption in response to employing an added unit of labor and 
the labor coefficient is the marginal addition to the supply of consumer goods in response 
to employing one more unit of labor in the consumer good sector. If then the wage rate 
exceeds the latter, the implication is that a marketable surplus cannot be generated in 
the consumer good industry since not even its own labor can be supplied with sufficient 
consumption. Hence, at the given wage rate the economy is not viable. This manifests 
itself by the fact that the slope of (10) is negative so that there can be no consumption 
constraint which is binding in the positive quadrant (i. e. , where all variables are 
positive). If the product is equal to one, the constraint is undefined. That would be the 
case in a subsistance economy where the entire food output is consumed on the farm. If 
and only if the product is smaller than one can we say that the system is viable. In that 
case the average product of labor in the consumer good industry exceeds the wage rate 
so that a marketable surplus can be generated to sustain employment also in the invest-
ment good sector. 
This system operates on the assumption that labor consumes its entire real wages 
and that consumption out of profits is zero. Alternatively, one can assume that the 
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consiimption by the owners of capital is subsumed under w in the form of a surplus value. 
Since profits are net of consumption, they represent savings. If all saving (net profits) 
are re-invested, it follows that the profit maximizing solution corresponds to that point 
on the feasibility surface where investment is at its maximum. Hence, given the 
assumptions of this model, profit maximization in a purely competitive free market 
economy automatically leads to the highest rate of investment and the fastest attainable 
rate of growth. If the two output variables are measured in terms of constant money 
units, national income (Y) in constant money terms can be obtained by the simple s\amma-
tion of C and I . Then if the Y corresponding to the maximal growth solution is known, 
the corresponding p -the social average rate of saving- can also be deduced with the help 
of (2) and (3). A higher rate of saving is not feasible and an attempt to force it cannot 
increase the rate of investment or rate of growth. If, on the other hand, a welfare 
decision is reached to increase the rate of consumption at the expense of investment, p 
can be reduced and total consumption can be increased along the feasibility function 
shown by the line segment AB in the diagram. However, since it is the growth maximizing 
point (B) which corresponds to the competitive free market solution, other output 
combinations on the feasibility function can only be achieved either by direct government 
intervention or by so adjusting the price and the wage structure as to motivate profit 
maximizing entrepreneurs to transfer labor and capital from the production of investment 
goods into the production of consumer goods. The employment consequences of such a 
move depend, in this simple framework, on the relative size of the fixed capital and 
labor coefficients in the two lines of production. In any case, the implied increase in the 
supply of consumer goods can make the employment of a correspondingly larger active 
labor force possible. 
If the intervention in the market is to be undertaken by decentralizedmeans, i. e. , 
by suitably adjusting the price structure, it is important to consider the shadow prices. 
Based on the well-known direct-dual correspondence of linear programming maximum 
and minimum problems, the relationships governing the price variables and the shadow 
prices themselves can readily be obtained. Their interpretation and implications for 
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